Central banks that lack credibility often tie their exchange rate to that of a more credible partner in order to "import" credibility. We show in a small open economy model that a central bank that displays "limited credibility" can deliver significant improvements to a social welfare function that contains no role for exchange rate stabilization by maximizing an objective function that places weight on exchange rate stabilization, and thus the central bank with limited credibility will peg their currency to that of a more credible partner. As the central bank's credibility improves it will place less weight on exchange rate stabilization in its objective function and thus loosen the peg. When the central bank is perfectly credible its objective function and the social welfare function are identical; it places no weight on exchange rate stabilization and allows the currency to freely float. Empirical results using a panel of both developed and developing countries show that as central banks become more independent they tend to allow more currency flexibility.
Introduction
The work of Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983) highlight the importance of time consistency in policy making. Countries with a weak institutional framework may lack the ability to commit to a future course of monetary policy. In this case optimal monetary policy may be to abandon a ‡oating exchange rate regime and tie the currency with a more credible partner.
Historically this has been the preferred option for many countries. Bordo and Kydland (1995) discuss this practice of pegging one's currency to gain credibility in terms of the pre-World War 1 gold standard. Bordo (2003) discusses how the development of institutions like strong, independent central banks has been an important precursor to the widespread adoption of ‡oating currencies by many developed countries since the end of the Bretton Woods system. Giavazzi and Pagano (1988) and Giavazzi and Giovannini (1989) discuss how "tieing ones hands" by to pegging the currency to the German Deutsche Mark an important motivation behind the adoption of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism, the precursor to the euro. Similarly, Calderón and Schmidt-Hebbel (2003) discuss the practice of pegging to gain credibility in many Latin American countries, and Mishkin and Calvo (2003) and Husain, Mody, and Rogo¤ (2005) discuss this practice in many developing and emerging market economies. This paper will explore this issue of how the lack of central bank credibility can be a motivation to adopt a currency peg. To do this we will calculate optimal monetary policy in a New Keynesian model of a small open economy, as in Gali and Monacelli (2005) or de Paoli (2009). However, unlike these models, the central bank in this small open economy displays limited credibility (also referred to as loose commitment). As in Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007) and Debortoli and Nunes (2010) the central bank will renege on previous commitments with a certain exogenous probability. This exogenous commitment probability is known by agents in the model, so the solution to the model a Markov-Perfect equilibrium, where agents form expectations based on the fact that the central bank may renege on past promises, and the central bank takes those expectations into account when deciding optimal policy.
Perfect commitment and perfect discretion are nested as boundary cases in this model of limited credibility, where the probability of commitment is either 1 (perfect commitment) or 0 (discretion). The optimal policy equilibrium can be solved for all values of the commitment probability along the continuum from perfect commitment to full discretion. When the central bank tries to maximize social welfare taking the probability of commitment as given, as the probability of commitment falls, the outcome from optimal monetary policy gets progressively worse. We show that by including exchange rate stability as an extra term in their objective function, the central bank with limited credibility can signi…cantly improve overall social welfare.
Thus this paper formally analyzes the bene…ts of exchange rate targeting under discretionary monetary policy. In addition, within the limited credibility framework, where the probability of commitment lies on a continuum between 0 and 1, this paper can analyze the link between the degree of commitment and the degree of exchange rate targeting.
This …nding is similar to that in Rogo¤ (1985) , who shows that a central bank that practices discretionary policy can signi…cantly improve overall social welfare by maximizing a central bank objective function that places more weight on in ‡ation stability than the overall social welfare function. In the small open economy model in this paper, the central bank with loose commitment can "tie their hands" by including exchange rate stability in their objective function. The fact that the central bank has this modi…ed objective, and the fact that agents know that the central bank has an exchange rate target will a¤ect the Markov-Perfect equilibrium solution to the game between agents and a central bank with loose commitment. The currency peg helps contain agents'in ‡ation expectations following a shock, and thus optimal policy from a central bank with a modi…ed objective function that includes exchange rate stability can result in a signi…cant improvement in overall social welfare, even though exchange rate stability is not part of the social welfare function. This is not to say that adopting a modi…ed objective function is an optimal outcome.
While adopting an exchange rate peg does result in a signi…cant welfare improvement taking the probability of commitment as given, the central bank that can commit can still deliver a better outcome than a less than credible central bank that adopts a currency peg. As discussed by Mishkin and Calvo (2003) the optimal outcome is for the country to develop the institutions to allow the central bank to commit.
In discussing why some countries may have a "fear of ‡oating", Calvo and Reinhart (2002) present a model where a central bank that lacks credibility would …nd it optimal to adopt a …xed exchange rate. Herrendorf (1997 Herrendorf ( , 1999 discusses adopting a currency peg as an e¤ective communication device by a central bank that practices discretionary policy.
By modeling the central bank in this limited credibility framework, in this paper we are able to model how the optimal weight on exchange rate stability is itself a function of the exogenous commitment probability. We show that the optimal exchange rate regime for a central bank that practices discretionary policy is a …xed peg. Under perfect commitment the optimal regime is a ‡oating exchange rate. As the commitment probability moves along the continuum from discretion to perfect commitment, the optimal exchange rate peg gets looser.
1
We then test the model's prediction that improvements in central bank credibility lead to looser exchange rate pegs. Using central bank independence as a proxy for central bank credibility (see e.g. Cukierman (1992) and Alesina and Summers (1993) ) we show in a panel of 96 developed and developing countries from 1998-2010 that improvements in central bank independence lead to increasing exchange rate ‡exibility.
In addition to the papers mentioned earlier that explored the relationship between central bank credibility and currency pegs in the historical context, Levy Yeyati, Sturzenegger, 1 Devereux and Engel (2003) and Engel (2011) discuss the optimality of a …xed exchange rate regime, but in these models, the central bank can commit. The prevalence of local currency pricing and the violation of the law of one price either diminishes the expenditure switching bene…t of a ‡oating currency or imposes a cost in terms of increased price dispersion. Thus the prevalence of local currency pricing may be a possible motivation behind adopting a …xed exchange rate. That channel is not present in this paper. Here we assume producer currency pricing and that the Law of One Price holds at the level of the individual good.
and Reggio (2010) show that the strength of political institutions is one key factor in explaining exchange rate regime choice. Similarly, Hakura (2005) …nds that exchange rate ‡exibility in emerging market countries has increased over the past decade, and argues that this "learning to ‡oat" appears to have involved a strengthening of monetary and …nancial policy frameworks in many countries.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The New Keynesian model of a small open economy with a central bank with loose commitment is presented in section 2. The results from numerical simulations of the model are presented in section 3. Namely, we calculate the optimal weight that the central bank with limited credibility places on exchange rate stability in its objective function, and show that this optimal weight in a decreasing function of the central bank exogenous probability of commitment. Then with impulse response diagrams we show the response of the output gap, in ‡ation, and the exchange rate following a mark-up shock and see how this response depends on the probability of commitment. By targeting the exchange rate, the optimal policy from central bank with loose commitment can produce impulse responses that look similar to those from optimal policy from a central bank with perfect commitment. In section 4 we present evidence from a panel data model that supports the model's main …nding that as central bank credibility increases, the central bank will loosen the exchange rate peg and move towards a ‡oating exchange rate regime.
Finally, section 5 concludes with some suggestions for further research.
Model
In the model there are two countries, home and foreign. The home country is of size n and the foreign country is of size 1 n, as n ! 0, the model becomes that of a small open economy. The small open economy is populated by a representative household and a continuum of …rms. Firms employ labor to produce a tradable consumption good and set prices according to a Calvo style price setting framework. In the small open economy there is a central bank that sets policy to maximize the second-order approximation of household welfare. The central bank displays limited credibility. It can commit and honor past promises only with an exogenous probability and thus in any period it will renege on past promises and reoptimize policy with some exogenous probability 1 .
Households
In the small open home economy, the representative household chooses consumption, C t , and labor e¤ort, h t , to maximize expected lifetime utility given by:
where is the household's discount factor and is the inverse of the Frisch labor supply elasticity.
The consumption good is produced in a perfectly competitive …nal goods sector that simply aggregates home and foreign goods in a CES production function:
where C H t (i) is the quantity of goods sold to the home market by home country …rm i 2 [0 n] and C F t (j) is the quantity imported into the home market and sold by foreign country …rm
is the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods, is the elasticity of substitution between goods from di¤erent …rms within the same country, and ! is the steady-state import share.
From the aggregator function in (2), the demand for either the home consumption good from …rm i or the foreign consumption good from …rm j are given by:
where P H t (i) is the price set by …rm i and P F t (j) is the price set by foreign …rm j (in the foreign currency). The Law of One Price holds, so if the good has a price P H t (i) in the home market, then its price in the foreign market is
, where S t is the nominal exchange rate in units of the domestic currency per units of the home currency. Thus the various price indices are given by:
In addition, the household's labor supply decision can be expressed as:
Asset Market Structure
We assume that asset markets are complete both domestically and internationally. Thus agents have access to a complete set of state-contingent securities. This implies that the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution is equalized across countries:
(5)
is the in ‡ation rate over the next period. The nominal interest rate { t is simply given by:
Using this equation and the de…nition of the real exchange rate, Q t =
StP t Pt
, it follows that:
Thus under complete asset markets, the price of the foreign consumption good relative to the home consumption good, Q t , is equal to the marginal utility of foreign consumption divided by the marginal utility of home consumption.
Firms
Home country …rm i 2 [0 n] produces output with the following production technology:
where h t (i) is the labor employed by the …rm in period t. Market clearing in the labor market requires that the total demand for labor by …rms is equal to the supply of labor from households,
The …rm's marginal cost of production, M C t , is simply equal to the wage rate.
Firms set prices according to a Calvo price setting framework. In period t, the …rm will be able to change its price in the domestic market with probability 1 p .
Thus if allowed to change their price in period t, the …rm will set a price to maximize:
where t is the marginal utility of household consumption in period t. The …rm that is able to change its price in period t will set its price to:
where t is the mark-up that the …rm charges over expected future marginal cost. This mark-up is stochastic and follows an AR(1) process with a steady state value = 1 .
Firms that can reset prices in period t will all reset to the same level, soP
Substitute this optimal price into the price index P
. Since a …rm has a probability of 1 p of being able to change their price, then by the law of large numbers in any period 1 p percent of …rms will reoptimize prices. Thus the price index for domestic traded goods, P H t , can be written as:
Derivation of New Keynesian Phillips Curve
The …rm's pricing decision in (9), combined with the labor market equilibrium condition in (4) and the asset market equilibrium condition in (7) yields the following derivation for the New Keynesian Phillips Curve that links the output gap,Ŷ t , to the current and future expected rate of in ‡ation for home country production,
. The output gap is de…ned as the log di¤erence between output and output in the ‡exible price equilibrium. The details of this derivation can be found in the appendix.
Monetary Policy
The central bank sets monetary policy in order to maximize the second-order approximation of the household's welfare in (1). As shown in Gali and Monacelli (2005) , this model, the maximization of the second-order approximation of welfare is equivalent to the minimization of the quadratic loss function of the output gap and the in ‡ation rate of home country produced goods:
We assume that the central bank displays imperfect credibility. Policy makers have a commitment technology, but with a certain exogenous probability they may renege on their earlier commitment. This exogenous probability is known by all agents in the model. This framework has been labeled as quasi-commitment or loose-commitment in Schaumburg and
Tambalotti (2007), Debortoli and Nunes (2010) , Debortoli, Maih, and Nunes (2014) , and Dennis (2014) . In any given period, the central bank will honor past commitments with probability and it will renege on previous commitments and reoptimize with probability 1 .
The central bank will seek to minimize the loss function in (11) subject to the New Keynesian Phillips Curve in (10). Due to the central bank's limited commitment, the solution will be the solution to a Markov problem, where agents' expectation of the next period's in ‡ation rate depends on whether the central bank will honor or renege on their commitment this period. As we will see in the next section, the fact that the central bank displays this loose commitment means that the value of the loss function L in this Markov-Perfect equilibrium is higher than it would have been if the central bank could fully commit. The possibility that the central bank may ex-post renege on prior commitments lowers ex-ante social welfare.
To improve ex-ante social welfare and partially make up for the fact that the central bank display limited commitment, the central bank may ex-ante choose to minimize a di¤erent loss function than the social loss function. This alternative loss function is known to all agents in the model and is a way to tie the central bank's hands and force them to adopt a policy that better mirrors the policy under perfect commitment. This alternative loss function doesn't actually make the central bank able to commit, it still will renege with the exogenous probability 1 . This is similar to the appointment of a conservative central banker in Rogo¤ (1985) . By minimizing a loss function that is di¤erent from the social loss function the central bank that cannot perfectly commit can actually lower the value of the social loss function and partially make up for increased social loss that steams from the fact that the central bank cannot commit.
A potential candidate for the alternative central bank loss function is the following:
where S t is the level of the nominal exchange rate and ( ) is the weight that the central bank places on nominal exchange rate stabilization in their loss function. From the de…nition of the real exchange rate we can derive the following condition that links changes in the nominal exchange rate to domestic in ‡ation and changes in the output gap:
From this condition it is clear that by putting weight on the exchange rate in their objective function, the central bank is introducing history dependence into their objective.
As shown by Jensen (2002) and Vestin (2006) , this history dependence can mitigate the adverse e¤ects arising from a central bank that cannot commit.
The central bank's problem now is to minimize the loss function in (12) subject to the Phillips curve in (10) and the equation describing exchange rate determination in (13). Of course, when ( ) = 0, the central bank's loss functionL is identical to the social loss function L. This weight ( ) is written as a function of the central bank's commitment probability because, as we shall see in the next section, as decreases, the value of that enables the central bank to minimize the social loss function increases. When is high and the central bank has a high commitment probability, is small or even zero, indicating that the central bank places very little weight on nominal exchange rate stability. As falls and the central bank has greater trouble honoring past commitments, rises. For some small values of , is so high that the optimal policy of the central bank is to adopt a …xed exchange rate. By adopting a …xed exchange rate, the central bank is deciding that since they have such a problem with ex-post commitment, the best way to maximize social welfare is to ex-ante remove themselves from the monetary policy making process.
Calibration
The 
Model Results
In the last section we discussed the intuition behind why a central bank with loose commitment might want to alter their own objective function in order to deliver a better outcome for overall social welfare. Intuitively the parameter that determines the weight that the central bank puts on exchange rate stability should itself be a decreasing function of the central bank's ability to commit, . First we will calculate the optimal value of from numerical simulations of the model. Then we will plot some impulse responses to show how the central bank adopting a policy that deviates from the social loss function can a¤ect the responses of the output gap, in ‡ation, the exchange rate, and the nominal interest rate following a mark-up shock. Finally we show how the various parameters in the model, like the degree of price stickiness or shock persistence might a¤ect the optimal weight that a quasi-credible central bank places on exchange rate stability.
3.1 The optimal weight on exchange rate stability, In the case of perfect credibility, = 1, the value of the social loss function is monotonically increasing in the weight that the central bank puts on exchange rate stability in their own loss function, and thus when = 1, the central bank's optimal choice of = 0. When = 0:7, the value of the social loss function is initially decreasing in , and the social loss function is minimized when = 1:46. By placing a small amount of weight on exchange rate stability in their own loss function, the central bank is able to lower the value of the social loss function to 0.87. When = 0:6, this optimal value of rises to 3.46. When = 0:5 the optimal value rises to 6.86. When = 0:4 it rises to 13.81. When = 0:3 the optimal value of is 36.76 and the central bank has nearly completely tied their own hands and adopted a …xed exchange rate. By sacri…cing their monetary independence, the central bank with limited credibility parameter = 0:3 is able to lower the social loss from 2.21 to 1.04.
One way to read the results in table 2 is to say that for a low enough value of the exogenous commitment probability , the central bank is "committing" to maintain a …xed exchange rate. Of course in this limited credibility model, the central bank's commitment probability is …xed. For a high enough value of in its objective function, the central bank really only cares about exchange rate stability. Suppose that in the previous period it promised to maintain a …xed exchange rate, and with probability 1 it is allowed to reoptimize this period. Since it only really cares about exchange rate stability, it will still maintain a …xed exchange rate. So even though the central bank was able to renege on past promises and reoptimize, it will appear as if past commitments were honored. For a high enough weight on the exchange rate in the loss function, it doesn't matter whether the central bank honors past promises or reneges, it will always choose the same thing. Hence, all functions under di¤erent values of will converge as ! 1 in …gure 1.
Impulse Responses
The responses of the output gap, in ‡ation, the nominal exchange rate, and However, adopting a …xed exchange rate is not without costs. As shown in table 2, the value of the social loss under the …xed exchange rate regime is 1.05 compared to that under the optimal policy from a central bank that can commit of 0.47. As shown in …gure 2, the central bank with limited credibility that chooses to …x the nominal interest rate cannot change the nominal interest rate. The central bank that can commit is able to lower the interest rate in the immediate aftermath of the shock and then increase it. The central bank with limited credibility is able to markedly improve their outcome by …xing the nominal exchange rate, but by holding the nominal interest rate constant, they lose a key instrument of monetary policy and so are still worse o¤ than optimal policy under full commitment.
The role of price stickiness or shock persistence
The results from numerical simulations of the model to …nd the optimal value of in the 
Empirical
The model in the previous section shows how a central bank that cannot fully commit to future actions can improve their monetary policy outcome by choosing to peg the nominal exchange rate to that of a more credible partner. In this section we show empirical evidence that as a central bank gains credibility, it tends to loosen any currency pegs and adopt a ‡oating exchange rate.
Empirical model, variables, and data
To establish this empirical link between central bank credibility and a ‡oating exchange rate, we will estimate a panel data model with an index of exchange rate ‡exibility as the dependent variable and a proxy for central bank credibility as the independent variable.
An index of whether a country has a …xed or ‡oating exchange rate is from Ilzetzki, Reinhart, and Reinhart (2008) . This index varies from (1) -"no separate legal tender" to (13) -"freely ‡oating" and in between covers varying degrees of exchange rate pegs. The exact de…nitions for each of the 13 index values are found in the appendix. We use annual data from 96 countries over 13 years, from 1998-2010. The full list of countries can be found in the appendix.
As a proxy for central bank credibility we use the index of central bank independence from Dincer and Eichengreen (2013) . Central bank independence has been used as a proxy for central bank credibility and institutional quality from as early as Cukierman (1992) and Alesina and Summers (1993) . Blinder (2000) reports that a vast majority of both central bank governors and academic economists cited central bank independence as one of the most important factors behind central bank credibility.
As control variables in this panel data regression we add trade openness (the sum of exports and imports divided by GDP), the in ‡ation rate in the previous year, the GDP growth rate in the previous year, and an indicator variable equal to one if a country has adopted in ‡ation targeting.
Empirical Results
The results from this panel data regression of exchange rate ‡exibility on central bank independence is presented in tables 3 and 4. Table 3 shows that when cross-section …xed e¤ects are not included in the panel data regression, there is a strong negative correlation between central bank independence and exchange rate ‡exibility. This suggests that there is a strong negative correlation between the two in the cross-section. The Euro Area countries in the sample drive this negative correlation. These are countries with a very independent central bank that score a 1 on the …xed- ‡oating index. This strong negative cross-sectional correlation disappears in the sub-panel of only developing and emerging market countries.
Including cross-section …xed e¤ects controls for the cross-sectional correlation between central bank credibility and the index of exchange rate ‡exibility. The coe¢ cient of central bank independence is now positive and signi…cant, indicating that when central bank independence improves in year t 1, holding all else equal, the index of exchange rate ‡exibility will shift towards ‡oating in year t.
The table shows that this fact holds throughout the various regression speci…cations with cross-section …xed e¤ects. This link between increases in central bank independence and increased exchange rate ‡exibility is especially true when we control for whether or not a country has adopted in ‡ation targeting. It also holds whether we include one or two lags of central bank independence. When we include two lags, the sum of the coe¢ cients on the two lags is signi…cantly positive. The coe¢ cient on trade openness is positive and signi…cant, indicating that holding all else equal, as a country becomes more open the central bank allows more ‡exibility in the exchange rate. The lagged values of the in ‡ation rate or the GDP growth rate do not have an e¤ect on the degree of exchange rate ‡exibility. Table 4 shows that these same results hold not just for the full panel of 96 countries but for the sub-panel of 75 developing and emerging market countries. Thus in both developed and developing counties, when central bank independence improves in year t 1, holding all else equal, the index of exchange rate ‡exibility shifts towards ‡oating in year t.
Summary and Conclusion
Historically, the lack of central bank credibility has been a motivation to adopt a currency peg. This paper sought to model this motivation in a small open economy where the central bank cannot perfectly commit to a future course of policy. In the model the central bank has limited credibility, with some exogenous probability it will renege on its previous promises and re-optimize. The limited credibility of the central bank imposes a welfare cost on society.
In ‡ation and in ‡ation expectations are not well anchored if agents assume that the central bank will renege on past promises. In this case, the social welfare is actually improved by assigning the central bank to minimize a loss function which is di¤erent from the social loss function. By including a term for nominal exchange rate stabilization in their loss function, even though the social loss does not contain a role for exchange rate stabilization, the central bank with limited credibility can communicate their commitment to keeping in ‡ation low and stable, and thus in ‡ation expectations remain anchored. The central bank with limited credibility can deliver a signi…cant welfare improvement by adopting an objective function that contains a role for exchange rate stabilization. This paper conducted numerical simulations to …nd the optimal weight on the exchange rate. For a central bank that can perfectly commit, this optimal weight is 0, and thus optimal policy is a ‡oating currency.
For a central bank that practices discretionary policy, the optimal policy is to adopt a …xed exchange rate.
In this model, limited credibility had a speci…c meaning. It meant the probability that the central bank will honor past commitments. In technical terms, it is the probability that previous in ‡ation expectations appear as a constraint in the central bank's maximization problem. The central bank still has the same underlying preferences and discount factor as the rest of society.
In many historical cases of a central bank that lacks credibility, the central bank or monetary authority actually has di¤erence preferences from the rest of society. This is most clearly illustrated when monetary policy is in the hands of an elected politician. Here one could say that the elected politician has a di¤erent discount factor or places a di¤erent weight on output in the output/in ‡ation trade-o¤ that society at large, and may try to stimulate the economy in the short run in order to win an upcoming election, at the cost of higher As presented in the text, the optimal price for a …rm that can change their price, P H t , is given by:
Furthermore, the expression for the evolution of the home goods price index is:
the household's labor supply decision Ĥ t +Ĉ t =Ŵ t P t , then we can write the NKPC as: De facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2% 9 Pre announced crawling band that is wider than or equal to +/-2% 10 De facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-5% 11 Moving band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2% (i.e., allows for both appreciation and depreciation over time) 12 Managed ‡oating 13 Freely ‡oating Responses of the output gap, the in ‡ation rate, and the nominal exchange rate to a positive cost-push shock. Blue line is from the model with perfect credibility, red line is from the model where the probability of committment is only , green line is from the model where the probability of committment is but the central bank places the optimal weight on the exchange rate in their objective function. In the left-hand column = 0:3, in the middle column = 0:5, and in the right-hand column = 0:7. Figure 4: Variances of the output gap, in ‡ation, the nominal exchange rate, and the social loss function as a function of the weight that the planner places on nominal exchange rate stability in their objective function. Shown as the AR(1) persistence parameter of the costpush shock process varies from 0.7 (blue line) to 0.9 (green line).
